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This paper aims at understanding the dynamics of sectarian violence in the city of 
Beirut, by looking at the early phase of violence in the Lebanese civil war (1975–90), 
and the process of dividing Beirut into various sectarian enclaves controlled by the 
warring militias. The paper aims to show the way in which political actors used 
sectarian violence as a mechanism of social, political, and territorial control. As a point 
of departure, the paper views the city not only as a backdrop for conflict and violence, 
but also as an actual target. The objectives of the paper are threefold. First, it shows how 
sectarian violence was not random but was, rather, a product of a lengthy process that 
involved calculation and some levels of planning. It includes defining one’s …/ 
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neighbour as an enemy and as a threat. Second, it shows the measures and practices that 
were employed by militias to consolidate the full control of territory that entailed the 
transformation of space and place into homogenous entities. Third, it looks at the 
centrality of the concepts of homogenization of space (and place) and territoriality in the 
course of waging sectarian violence. 
   1
1 Introduction 
On 5 August 1976, Muslim (Lebanese and Palestinian) residents of the eastern suburbs 
of Beirut were violently forced to leave their homes. Their expulsion came after several 
months of fighting over the control of quarters and neighbourhoods in Beirut’s suburbs 
between Christian militias, on the one hand, and the predominantly Muslim and Leftist 
militias and their Palestinian allies, on the other.
1 The displacement of the Lebanese and 
Palestinian Muslim population from eastern Beirut was a major event in a sequence of 
mass displacements and population exchanges that took place in the early years of 
Lebanon’s civil war, when members of various sectarian communities were forced to 
leave mixed areas and move to areas where they enjoyed higher sectarian homogeneity.  
The war over the control of areas in Beirut during the first two years of Lebanon’s civil 
war (1975–77) was insanely violent. Massacres, mass population displacement, and 
indiscriminate shelling resulted in cutting the city of Beirut into sectarian enclaves 
(Davie 1991, 2005; Khalaf 2006). What the war had markedly produced was not only 
the loss of civilians and the destruction of the city’s built environment, but also the 
killing of the prospects for an open and plural city. War and violence transformed Beirut 
into an enclaved city. It was both a ‘war of the city’ and a ‘war within the city’ (Shaw 
2004: 141). 
This paper deals with the early phases of Lebanon’s civil war in what was labelled the 
‘Two-Year War’ (1975–77), when fighting broke out between the predominantly 
Christian militias, and the predominantly Muslim and Leftist militias and their 
Palestinian allies. While war erupted in most parts of the country, rural and urban, the 
intensity and severity of fighting was at its highest in mixed urban areas and especially 
in Beirut. The paper, thus, looks at the events that took place in the city of Beirut with a 
focus on the city’s eastern suburbs, where violence resulted in the expulsion of the 
Lebanese Muslim (mostly Shias) and Palestinian population.  
The paper aims at reconstructing the story of violence in Beirut, and the process of 
dividing the city into various sectarian enclaves controlled by warring militias.
2 It looks 
at the use of collective violence by political actors as a mechanism of social, political, 
and territorial control.
3 As such, the objectives of the paper are: 
                                                 
1  I use this terminology in referring to the warring factions based on their use in the media and by the 
factions themselves. I drop the Rightist label of ‘Christian forces’, as these forces’ involvement in the 
war was communal rather than based on pure-right political ideology. The same does not apply to the 
Leftist group, where a number of armed organizations became involved in the war on the basis of 
Marxist ideology; namely, the Communist Party and Communist Action Organization.  
2  The analysis in this paper is based on 40 semi-structured open-ended interviews with residents, 
militiamen and local politicians who lived in the eastern suburbs of Beirut in 1975–77. The interviews 
investigated the respondents’ experiences during the Two-Year War, including the stories of six 
militiamen who took part in the armed conflict. Fieldwork was conducted between spring 2005 and 
summer 2006. In addition, the paper undertakes an analysis of the discourse of active political leaders 
and organizations during the early period of civil war. Discourse analysis is based on material – 
stories, speeches, and interviews – covered in newspapers during that period in Lebanon’s civil war. 
3  Other writings on the dynamics of violence in Beirut include Khalaf’s (2002, 2006) work on the 
history of violence and some of its urban forms, Johnson (1986, 2001) on the political dynamics on   2
•  To show how the process of homogenization of space and re-territorialization by 
means of violence was not random. Collective violence was a product of 
‘planning’, and was an outcome of a process that defined one’s neighbour as an 
enemy and as a threat to local fabric. 
•  To show the measures and practices employed to consolidate full control of 
territory and which entailed the transformation of space and place into a 
homogenous entity through actions and measures such as building partition 
barriers, checkpoints, and murals aimed at asserting and maintaining one group’s 
control over place and space. 
•  To look at the centrality of the concepts of homogenization of space and place,
4 
and territoriality in the course of waging collective violence.
5  
The paper posits that cities are more than a backdrop for conflict and violence. Cities 
themselves are the target of deliberate and engineered campaigns that seek ‘to destroy 
the security, public order, civility, and quality of life of all their citizens, and damage or 
destroy the viability and liveability of the city itself’ (Safier 2001: 422). Conflict and 
violence destroy not only cities’ ‘built environment and the urban political economy but 
cities as social institutions and the very fact of urbanism itself’ (Beall 2007: 4). In 
communally mixed cities, the target is often the ‘other’ in ‘our’ city. This stems from 
the desire of one group to dominate the territory and to re-territorialize it in an exclusive 
way that involves expelling and killing the ‘others’, and destroying their livelihood, 
infrastructure, and their built environment. 
2  How it all started  
By the early 1970s, political and sectarian tension in Lebanon was very high. The 
background of the political rift included conflict over changing the power-sharing 
mechanism to give the Muslim population a better stake in the government. It also 
included the position of Lebanon vis-à-vis the regional crises that were shaking the 
Middle East during that period, chiefly the Palestinian–Israeli question. Tension 
accelerated after signing the Cairo Agreement in 1969 between the Lebanese state and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which granted the right of Palestinian 
militias to bear arms and operate on Lebanese land in order to launch guerrilla attacks 
on Israel (El-Khazen 2000). The majority of Christian politicians and political groups 
were sceptical about the agreement, as they saw in it a major threat to the sovereignty of 
Lebanon. The majority of Muslim politicians, however, accepted the agreement, partly 
out of fear of opposing the revolutionary and radical Arab-nationalist sentiments that 
were sweeping the Muslim streets (Johnson 2001). The political system’s failure to 
                                                                                                                                               
the eve of the war, and Davie (2002, 2005) on Beirut’s green line and the process of territorial control 
by militias.  
4  Whereas part of the literature sees space as abstract and place as concrete, another part sees place as a 
space with meaning (see Massey 1992); the use of the two terms in this paper follows Massey’s work 
in this area (Massey 2004), who argues that both place and space are concrete.  
5  Violence is defined here as ‘a basic form of social action that occurs under concrete conditions, targets 
concrete victims, creates concrete settings and produces concrete results’ (Shroder and Schmidt 2001: 
6).    3
mediate between the conflicting parties, and its inability to mitigate this crisis, increased 
the political divide.  
Communal tension was exacerbated as increased awareness of sectarian identity and 
politicization of communities were at their peak. Political parties and movements were 
organized, more than ever, across sectarian representation. The Lebanese Kataeb Party, 
for example, succeeded in mobilizing the Maronite
6 community and in spearheading an 
agenda to protect their communal rights (Entelis 1973, 1974). Similarly, the Shia 
Movement of the Disinherited emerged as a formidable and popular movement in its 
demands for a better share for Shias in the Lebanese polity (Norton 1987). Other 
sectarian movements included the mostly Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and 
the predominantly Sunni Murabitoun Movement. Such sectarianization of politics 
contributed to high levels of communal polarization.  
In Beirut’s eastern suburbs, as in other communally mixed areas in Lebanon, the 
Palestinian presence became a major dividing line between communities. Polarization 
over the Palestinian question and Palestinian military activity on Lebanese land 
concurred with other structural issues. Many of the disenfranchised Muslims and, 
particularly, the Shias – who felt the skewness of the political system towards Maronite 
Christians and wealthy Lebanese – were attracted to the Palestinian cause. They found 
in it a space of rebellion against traditional politics. As one former Lebanese militant 
who fought with Fatah, the military wing of the Palestinian National Liberation 
Movement, puts it: 
I joined the Fida’yeen [the term, meaning ‘commandos’ in Arabic, was 
used to refer to Palestinian militants] training sessions when I was 14. I 
joined a non-Lebanese group as I believed at that time that the Kataeb 
were prevailing over everything. Kataeb and Ahrar [two Christian 
parties] were clearly our enemies.  
For Christians, and particularly Maronites – who did not have a ‘real problem with the 
[Muslims and] Shias’, as one respondent described it – the Palestinian and Muslim 
armed presence had become very disturbing. The visibility of Palestinian militiamen 
and their Lebanese allies on the streets and in Christian neighbourhoods became more 
than a nuisance: it was seen as a tangible threat. More importantly, it was a sign of the 
fragility and loss of sovereignty of the state of which Christians had, so far, been main 
guardians. 
It was inevitable that, with heightened sectarian tension and failure of the political 
system to resolve the conflict, a clash would occur. Several violent episodes took place 
in the early 1970s before an orgy of violence broke out in April 1975 between the 
Muslim-Leftists and their Palestinian allies, and the Christian-Maronite side. The war 
was fought by consortiums of sectarian militias and ideological parties, led by warlords 
and strongmen. On the Christian side, the Lebanese Kataeb Party (LKP), as the leading 
Christian party, ‘naturally’ became the leading organization in the ‘protection’ of 
Christians and Christian areas. LKP led a group of small Christian militias in the two-
year offensive against Palestinian and Muslim forces in East Beirut. These militias 
                                                 
6  The Maronites are an eastern Christian sect that follow the Catholic Church in Rome. They are the 
largest Christian community in Lebanon, comprising around 35 per cent of Lebanon’s population.    4
ranged from groups of defected Christian army officers, to small local strongmen who 
wanted to defend their neighbourhoods and towns, to ultra-nationalist and xenophobic 
factions. 
On the other side of the conflict, most of the Muslim and Leftist militias operated under 
the umbrella of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a consortium of 12 parties 
and movements under the leadership of Kamal Jumblat, a Druze
7 zaim
8 and head of the 
Progressive Socialist Party (MERIP 1977). The LNM militia allied with Palestinian 
militias under the banner of the so-called ‘Joint Forces’. During the first two years of 
the war, LNM factions relied heavily on the logistic and arms support from Palestinian 
organizations (El-Khazen 2000). Militias included armed wings of parties such as the 
Communists, Arab Nationalists, and Syrian Nationalists, in addition to sectarian forces 
such as the Shia Amal Movement, which became the military arm of Musa Sadr’s 
Movement of the Disinherited and smaller Sunni factions in Sunni areas of West Beirut. 
Beside the sectarian militias and armed wings of political parties, local neighbourhood 
armed groups led by local strongmen emerged as ‘protectors’ of their communities 
(Farsoun 1976). 
The first phase of the war lasted for two years and came to be known as the ‘Two-Year 
War’. It was one of the most violent acts of warfare. It resulted in the killing of around 
35,000 people, mostly civilians (Randal 1984). Gruesome massacres and expulsions of 
people were committed in the first few months of the war. The Two-Year War was 
mostly urban warfare. The eastern suburbs became the main arena for this war. Most of 
the fighting and clashes were around, or en route to, the Palestinian refugee settlements, 
known as camps, in Tal Za’atar, Jisr El-Basha, and Dbaye; and in the predominantly 
Shia and Muslim quarters and neighbourhoods in the areas of Sin El-Fil, Bourj 
Hamoud, Maslakh, Qarantina, Naba’a, and Dekwaneh (see Figure 1).  
The major Palestinian and Muslim-Leftist stronghold in the largely Christian eastern 
suburbs was Tall Za’atar Camp and its nearby Shia and Muslim-controlled 
neighbourhood of Naba’a (see Figure 1). As clashes intensified, Christian forces in the 
eastern suburbs saw in these areas an imminent threat – being under the control of 
Palestinian and Leftist-Muslim forces and as ‘bases for launching attacks became 
unbearable’.
9 The Christian forces’ decision was to ‘liberate’ the area.
10 Violence 
erupted in early 1976 but was at its height in the summer of that year. After a nine-
month siege, Tal Za’atar, Naba’a, and other neighbourhoods fell under the control of 
Christian militias. There were a large number of casualties during the siege. It is 
estimated that in Tall Za’atar alone, ‘perhaps 3,000 Palestinians, mostly civilians, died 
in the siege and its aftermath’ (Harris 1996: 165). Khalili describes the Tal Za’atar 
attack as ‘the most numerically significant massacre in the chronicle of atrocities 
perpetuated against Palestinians in the twentieth century’ (Khalili 2005: 37). A large 
number of Christians, militants, and civilians also fell in this war. There is no accurate 
estimate of the numbers: one Christian militiaman interviewed for this study lost four of 
                                                 
7  A small Islamic sect. 
8  Zaim (plural Zu‘ama) in Arabic means a traditional political leader or political patron.  
9  From interviews with former militiamen.  
10 Ibid.   5
Figure 1: Beirut’s sectarian composition during the clashes in 1975 and after the division in 1977 
 
    Source: Compiled by author based on reports from various newspapers 1975−77. 
   6
his brothers and sisters and six other family relatives. Two of them fell while fighting in 
the eastern suburbs in 1976. 
The fighting and its aftermath eventually led to the displacement of almost all Muslim 
(Lebanese and Palestinian) residents from these areas. It was estimated that 30,000 
Lebanese Muslims and 30,000 Palestinian Muslims were displaced from the eastern 
suburbs. The Palestinian camps were completely bulldozed over to prevent any return. 
Most of the displaced resettled in the predominantly western side of Beirut (Nasr 1993). 
Displacement of Shias and other Muslims from the eastern suburbs was confronted with 
forced displacement of Christian residents from West Beirut and its southern suburbs. 
The Two-Year War resulted primarily in the division of Beirut into two major enclaves: 
the Christian-controlled east, and the Muslim and Leftist-controlled west. The green line 
between the two sides of Beirut was ‘installed’ as a no-man’s-land, with a handful of 
militia controlled-crossings between the two Beiruts (see Figure 1). The division lasted 
until a peace settlement was reached towards the end of 1990. 
3 Collective  violence,  expulsion and homogenization
11 
The campaign to homogenize areas in Beirut was often declared as a security-necessity 
based on the assumption that members of the other collective group posed a threat.
12 It 
is a perception that saw individuals of each collective group as members of a 
homogenous entity that was causing a threat. The campaign to control the eastern 
suburbs of Beirut in the 1975–77 phase of the war stemmed from this very assumption. 
It was portrayed by Christian-Maronite political and militant figures as a strategic 
security necessity. It was justified on the basis of the military and security threat from 
the presence of Palestinian Camps and quarters with a predominantly Muslim-Shia 
population in a historically Christian area. 
Christian forces saw the threat to the eastern suburbs from a frontier perspective, fearing 
that a military defeat would mean linking these Palestinian and Muslim-Shia areas to 
the predominantly Muslim West Beirut. As a former Christian militia officer from the 
Sin El-Fil suburb described it, ‘we had seven fronts’ – referring to the surrounding areas 
that were controlled by Muslim Shias and Palestinian forces. This, had it materialized, 
could have led to Muslim and Palestinian control of all Christian areas in the city of 
Beirut and its suburbs.
13  
The raison d’être saw the defence of the locality intertwined with defending the 
community and the nation. The relationship became one of three intermingling circles: 
                                                 
11 Violence in Beirut and its suburbs was, indeed, perpetrated from both sides. The focus here, however, 
will be on the Christian militias’ final push to eject the Muslim and Palestinian population from the 
eastern suburb. The focus on the Christian militias is by no means an attempt to vindicate other 
factions from violence but, rather, is studied here as an example of using collective violence for the 
sectarian homogenization of space and place. 
12 Boal makes the same observation in Belfast, ‘where ethnic difference would be eliminated by removal 
of one of the sources of the threat’ (Boal 2001: 11). 
13 From interviews with former militiamen.   7
the neighbourhood or town, the Christian community, and Lebanon as a nation. The 
failure or defeat in the locality meant  he defeat of the whole community and a downfall 
for the nation. This logic mobilized many of the Christian residents of the eastern 
suburbs. To George,
14 who was eighteen during that period: 
There was an atmosphere created that we have to defend the 
neighbourhood. The feeling at that time was a matter of survival. 
Everyone carried a gun; some guns were so dated and were used in the 
Second World War. I even carried a rifle and went one day to patrol the 
locality.  
3.1  Discourse of fear: ‘They want to throw us in the sea’ 
The discourse of fear was instrumental in mobilizing support for armed groups. It 
became a central part of the rhetoric and discourse of political and conflict 
entrepreneurs. The perception of fear involved a set of emotions that were evoked from 
the threat surrounding a person. Political actors and conflict entrepreneurs tended to 
exaggerate the threat of the other to strengthen the bonding of their communities and 
group sentiments. This emphasized and strengthened the leader’s duty and role in 
defending against the threat and in countering fear. The discourse of fear was often 
complemented with self-portrayal of capability of self-defence and protection.  
The discourse of threat of existence was very effective in communal mobilization 
during the war in Lebanon, particularly among the Christians and the Maronites. It 
played well in the collective psyche of the Christians. Its wide resonance goes deep into 
the feeling of the Christians and Maronites as minorities in the wider sea of Arabs and 
Muslims. Several political slogans were created to spread fear of the ‘enemy’. The 
exaggeration of the enemy’s force, including their military power and encroaching 
intention, were played time and again. One of the widespread stories that contributed to 
the creation of a sense of fear was the rumour of boats waiting to ship Christians from 
Lebanon.
15 Fear among the Christians became, as Pierre Gemayel described it, ‘organic, 
visceral, and unshakable’. Gemayel goes further in portraying fear among the Christians 
as natural and the request for reassurance from the other group: ‘we can’t do anything 
about it. It’s up to the Muslims to give us reassurances’ (Rouleau 1975/76: 242). 
The fear of annihilation became a suitable pretext for arming and for mobilization. It 
was often portrayed in interviews that Christians were forced to arm and defend 
themselves. Part of the success of the Christian forces in East Beirut was in their 
portrayal of the principles of countering fear by the right of self-defence. Violence was 
seen as the only means to survive and to stay alive, as one militiaman of the Christian 
forces described it: 
We imaginated that we will die. We were either going to get killed or kill 
them. This was the norm (mafhoum). This was put in our head. We were 
                                                 
14 Interviewed in eastern suburb of Beirut. 
15 This story was mentioned several times in interviews with Christian respondents. The origin of the 
story is not clear, neither is its accuracy.   8
told that all the Muslims are going to kill us, all the Palestinians will kill 
us, all the Druze will kill us, and all the Arabs will kill us. 
3.2  The militarization of the others and their spaces 
For violence to be collective, the process involved creating the mental image of the 
other as militant. It entailed the militarization of the other, and portraying him as an 
occupier and as a security threat. Labelling the other and the other’s spaces and areas as 
‘military’ justified the military campaign to cleanse these areas. This step was crucial to 
rallying militant support against the perceived enemy. It prepared the stage for violence, 
and paved the way for expelling and killing the other. So, what was called the ‘misery 
belt’ around Beirut became the ‘military belt’.
16  
Quarters, buildings, and thousands of their residents became ‘militarized’. They were 
seen as targets and military posts that needed either to be destroyed or controlled. 
Labelling this area as a ‘military belt’, and the naming of the Shia Muslim, and 
Palestinian neighbourhoods and quarters as ‘military bases’ by the Christian forces and 
militias was a powerful way to show the threat of these areas and to mobilize military 
action against them.
17 The terminology used was very indicative of the dynamics of 
collective violence and how it unfolded. As Peteet puts it, ‘names are thus not only 
components of a repertoire of mechanisms of rule and a prominent part of historical 
transitions but are, methodologically speaking, themselves a means of tracking power in 
this process’ (Peteet 2005: 154).  
3.3  Expulsion and ‘urban cleansing’ 
As violence became an acceptable means by which to achieve order, the 
expulsion/purification machine was wide and diverse – and, by nature, it was 
indiscriminate. Whether in the random kidnapping and counter-kidnapping of members 
from the other community, or ‘identity-killing’ (where militiamen checked IDs and, 
based on name, religion, and origin rounded-up those from the other communities), the 
objective was to push members of the other community from territories the militias 
were aiming to homogenize. Indiscriminate killing by shelling ‘enemy’ neighbourhoods 
and areas aimed at targeting all those associated with the ‘other’ group. 
Consequently, collective violence forced individuals and families to move from mixed 
areas and neighbourhoods to those with higher sectarian homogeneity. Almost all 
Muslims were displaced from the eastern suburbs and other Christian-dominated areas. 
Many Christians, in return, were displaced from West Beirut and the Muslim dominated 
areas. No exact data on population exchange in the first two years are available, but 
statistics in later dates show the extent of change that took place in a short period of 
                                                 
16 The term ‘misery belt’ was widely used in the media to refer to the area that stretched around the 
municipal boundaries of Beirut that consisted of low-income neighbourhoods and quarters. The ‘belt’ 
ranged from a low-income neighbourhood to tin-built squatter settlements and Palestinian refugee 
camps. The residents in the ‘belt’ were mostly Shia Muslim working-class Lebanese, in addition to 
Palestinians, Kurds, and other foreign labour migrants, especially Syrians. 
17 See Abu Arz press conference on 9 August 1976 in An-Nahar, 26 July 1976 and 10 August 1976.   9
time. Between 1975 and 1989, the proportion of Christians in West Beirut dropped from 
30–40 per cent to 5 per cent. In Ashrafieh area in East Beirut, the proportion of the 
Muslim population dropped from 4–10 per cent in 1975 to less than 1 per cent during 
and after the war. Similarly, the eastern suburbs of Beirut had a Muslim population of 
40 per cent in 1975 compared with 5 per cent in 1989 (Huybrechts 1991; Nasr 1993; 
Genberg 2002). 
4  Transforming space  
After the expulsion of members of the ‘other’ community, further measures were 
employed to reorganize the urban space and territory to reflect the new political and 
military realities. The city and its milieus were ‘redesigned’ by the military machine to 
reaffirm the new military, social, and political orders. Militia leaders and their men 
became urban designers and, through their monopoly of violence in the areas under their 
control, they re-produced a new spatial order.  
First came the setting up of physical boundaries to demarcate one’s area against that of 
the other. The biggest division was through the green line between East and West 
Beirut, a ‘line’ that stretched from the old city southward along the Damascus and Old 
Saida roads dividing the city into two enclaves (see Figure 1). It created a narrow no-
man’s-land between the two areas. Makeshift walls were built, and sandbags and burned 
buses were installed to achieve this physical partition. Although this partition arose 
from efforts to maintain a sense of communal security, as portrayed by leaders of the 
militia, it contributed to maintaining and protracting the conflict. It perpetuated an 
atmosphere of fear. It was analogous to Peter Marcuse’s description of how walls 
‘represent power, but they also represent insecurity; domination but at the same time 
fear; protection but at the same time isolation’ (Marcuse 1994: 43; see also Shirlow 
2001). 
The partition and enclaving were, then, enforced. The sniper was the most effective 
person in monitoring the borders of the area and keeping the ‘enemy’ at bay. Snipers 
occupied high-rise buildings that offered access and a view to a wide expand of areas. 
They would kill, indiscriminately, any individual who crossed from the enemy area to 
theirs. Snipers succeeded in building mental walls and psychological borders for the 
Beirutis. They were fast and effective in redrawing the war map and communication 
lines of the city. The sniper became the guardian of the geography of fear that spread 
over Beirut during the 15 years of civil war. 
4.1  Control and homogenization of territory 
The control and homogenization of territory was engineered in various ways: by the 
installation of checkpoints; by means of posters and artwork; and by bulldozing spaces 
and places. 
Checkpoints  
Members of the militia manned checkpoints, the purpose of which was to make sure 
that whoever was passing was trusted and was one of ‘us’. They acted as deterrents to   10
the enemy or members of the other community due to fear of interrogation, harassment, 
kidnapping, or even killing – as happened during the ID-killing campaign in 1976. A 
handful of checkpoints at the city’s green line served as border crossings. They were the 
most obvious physical manifestation of the mechanism of inclusion and exclusion that 
sorted out who is with ‘us’ and who is with ‘them’.  
Posters and artwork 
Murals, political posters, graffiti,  and pictures of fallen ‘martyrs’ and leaders were 
spread on the walls and other structures. These measures asserted the identity and 
ideology of the territory and its people. They aimed at confirming the power of militias 
over space and place, and to remind residents and passers by of the authority in an area 
or locality. 
Bulldozing  
Bulldozing spaces and places of the ‘other’ was the last phase in the reproduction of 
space. It was a very powerful method in the campaign to control and homogenize 
territory. The destruction of houses, shops, and religious sites was intended to make sure 
that no one from the other community would return – at least, not easily. This was 
notable in the bulldozing of the Palestinian refugee settlements of Tall Za’atar and Jisr 
el-Basha in Beirut’s eastern suburbs, and the slum areas of Qarantina and Maslakh. The 
destruction of entire neighbourhoods, although stemming from a pretext of the illegality 
of these settlements, was aimed at sealing off the area from the ‘other’ – an act that 
proved to be successful.  
5  A new territorial reality: republics of militias 
The control of territory transcended the spatial control to full hegemony. In addition to 
achieving security, territoriality including the control of social, political, and economic 
milieus became a crucial way of consolidating power and defining the group’s identity 
within spatial boundaries. As such, East Beirut was born and constructed as a Christian 
and Maronite area. It became a territory with a well-defined political ideology and under 
a social-political regime influenced and dictated by Christian militias. It was portrayed 
as the ‘liberated area’ (al-mantaqa al-mouhrara) in reference to liberating it from 
Palestinian and Muslim-Leftist militias. At the same time, the birth of East Beirut gave a 
distinctive territorial identity for Christians. It offered a power base for Christian 
militias and a base for further control, either by political negotiation or by force. East 
Beirut became a mini republic for the Christian forces. 
Though it was one of the most violent episodes in the war, the account of the ‘making’ 
of East Beirut by violence was not atypical. Similar practices and policies were 
employed in other parts of the city, and in the subsequent phases of war and violence in 
Beirut and in Lebanon. West Beirut was born in the same vein. It was labelled as the 
‘city of fortitude’ (madinat as-soumoud) and the ‘patriotic area’. Later on, other quarters 
and neighbourhood were re-territorialized under a new militia regimes – such as the 
southern suburbs of Beirut under the control of Shia armed factions.   11
The experiences and events of the Two-Year War in Beirut showed the centrality of 
homogenization of place and territoriality on the basis of collective identity. Sectarian 
territorialization was an integral part of the war, as it reflected the power of one faction 
and, at the same time, helped to make and shape the collective identity of each group.  
After establishing their spatial and political control through violence, militias moved to 
run the economies of the areas under their reign. Operating their own tax system, 
managing illegal transactions, and preying on private and public funds, militias 
established their own mini-states. The total militia revenues during the period 1975–90 
were estimated to be about US$ 40 billion, exceeding that of the country’s GNP (Dib 
2004: 157).  
6 Conclusion   
This paper has demonstrated how collective violence in Beirut during the first two years 
of the civil war (1975–77) was part of a planned process to achieve territoriality and 
control over the political, social, and economic milieus of the city. Controlling territory 
to achieve a sense of security was often portrayed as the goal of the warring factions. 
However, control turned to the practice of full hegemony over space, politics, and 
economy. 
Waging violence entailed the definition of the ‘other’ as a threat. The discourse of fear 
of extermination played well in mobilizing communities against each other, as did the 
discourse of threat from strangers. When construed as a threat, members of the ‘other’ 
group were forced to leave the territory. The terror of sectarian purification became 
contagious.  
Through the homogenization of space and the expulsion of the ‘other’ community, 
violence was engineered to counter the very nature of city-ness as a heterogeneous 
place. Violence reshaped the city, cutting it into sectarian enclaves and, thus destroying 
one central aspect of city life: its diversity. Homogenization, as such, destroyed the 
foundations of urban culture and society. Violence maimed Beirut’s existence as a 
mixed and plural city. It enclaved the city and killed its prospects of being open and 
heterogeneous.  
The paper has shown how the city was more than a backdrop or a stage for conflict and 
violence. Beirut, as a mixed city, was itself the target. Its residents and its environment 
were deliberately attacked, and the target was the ‘other’ in ‘our’ city. This stemmed 
from the desire of one group to dominate the territory and to re-territorialize it in an 
exclusive way to the extent of expelling and killing the others, and destroying their 
livelihood and their built environment.   12
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